Killing the Death Penalty and Losing Our Moral Nerve
"When a murder occurs, the
community is obliged, regardless how unpleasant, to clear its throat as it were
and declare a communal response. Yale professor of computer science David
Gelernter, who was letter-bombed in June 1993 and nearly lost his life, has put
the matter clearly. We execute convicted murderers in order to make a communal
proclamation: namely, that murder, an evil so terrible and so utterly defiling
to a community, is intolerable. An execution forces the community “to assume
forever the burden of moral certainty; it is a form of absolute speech that
allows no waffling or equivocation. Deliberate murder, the community announces,
is absolutely evil and absolutely intolerable, period.”
But there is a fundamental
problem here—a problem that eclipses the deep and contentious philosophical
debates surrounding the death penalty. The problem is our culture’s unwillingness
to pass moral judgments. Morally speaking, we have grown accustomed to equivocating,
and in so doing we have cut ourselves off at the knees. American society’s
moral evasiveness begins with its indifference to the moral marker “Thou shalt
not murder.” The Torah, it must be remembered, does not forbid taking the life
of a human being; rather, it forbids murder. Indeed, Jewish and Christian moral
traditions concur in acknowledging justifiable forms of homicide, such as
self-defense, civilian protection, resisting insurrection, and just war. In a
morally courageous society, this list would be extended to include executing
those who commit the ultimate in human crime.
Harry Weller, Senior Assistant
State’s Attorney for the state of Connecticut, who represented the state’s
interests in the appeal of Connecticut’s first death sentence in 30 years,
argues that “when society convicts someone of murder it cannot ‘turn away its
eyes’ but must impose the sentence required by law.” In this regard he cites
the contemporary relevance of the eleventh-century Jewish commentator Rashi,
who warns that one cannot act in a cowardly manner by transforming the
victimizer into a victim. For Rashi and for Weller, it is morally inexcusable
for society to say, “One citizen is already dead. Why should we take the life
of another?”Despite the potential for error and the complexities
surrounding capital punishment, the state has not only the right but a duty to
deter and punish violent criminals while protecting its law-abiding citizenry.
Any potential victim of a murderer deserves nothing short of the highest protection,
which only the existence of the death penalty offers."
--J. Daryl Charles, Capital Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Violating Human Sanctity
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